The Principle of Double Effect and the Problem of Dirty Hands
I discussed the problem of dirty hands (PoDH) here and here and suggested that one can apply the principle of double effect (PDE) to the PoDH.
What is the PDE?
Some acts are such that they have good and bad effects: the good is intended; the bad is not. In this sense, the act has a double effect: an intended good and an unintended bad. For example, amputating a limb is morally wrong if the only intended results of the amputation are the loss of the amputee’s body part and the pain associated with the surgery. Morality demands that the act has some intended good effect that counterbalances or outweighs any unintended bad effect.
Suppose Jones has a gangrenous limb. The amputation of his part produces the intended good effect of saving Jones’ life and the unintended but anticipated bad consequences of Jones losing a limb and suffering pain. In this case, (at least in some situations) the good effect of amputation contributes to its justification despite its bad effects, horrible as they are.
In which cases are acts with double effects justified? The PDE helps us to reason about this question. According to the PDE, an act with a double effect is morally permissible only if the following conditions are met:
The act in itself (i.e., the intrinsic nature of the act bracketed from its extrinsic features, results, etc.) is morally acceptable or at least neutral.
The good effect is intended, and the bad effect is not intended, though it may be a foreseen side effect;
The bad effect is not a means to the good effect;
The good effect is sufficiently desirable to compensate for permitting the bad effect, though the agent does as much as possible to minimize the undesirable extent of the bad effect.
The first condition is the intrinsic nature condition; the second is the proper intention condition; the third is the no bad means condition; the fourth is the proportionality condition.
Back to Jones’ amputation: does it meet the four conditions of the PDE?
Arguably, the surgery in itself is acceptable or at least neutral, and so (1) is met. The good effect of saving Jones’ life is intended; the bad results of loss and pain are not intended, though foreseen. Thus, (2) is covered. The good effect of saving Jones follows from the surgery, but not from the bad effects of the loss and pain, and hence (3) is met. And the beneficial consequence of saving Jones is sufficient to compensate for the negative consequences of his loss and pain. As such, the proportionality demand of (4) is covered. Hence, Jones’ amputation meets all four conditions of the PDE and, therefore, is morally justified.
Now, how does the PDE relate to the PoDH? (If you’ve been following the current events of military significance, you should see the relevance of the PDE.)
Recall the PoDH as I set it up:
Suppose a political leader has a political/governmental obligation to do what is morally wrong. The leader’s duty of statecraft requires a violation of moral duty. This is the PoDH. For instance, suppose the leader must approve the bombing of a military target; the bombing will destroy an evil threat to his nation and the citizens he has sworn to protect. But the same action will also cause a large number of unintended though foreseen civilian deaths.
An advocate of the PDE might run the situation through the four criteria above. If the military action under consideration meets each criterion, then (the advocate of the PDE might argue) the action is morally acceptable. And if the action is acceptable, the leader’s hands are not dirty. The PoDH has been neutralized.
One advantage of this move is that it addresses the PoDH in a morally and intellectually careful manner. The move is not too fast; rather, it is made with a good degree of circumspection, and it accounts both for consequentialist and non-consequentialist intuitions.
However, two challenges come to mind. First, the advocate of this move must be prepared to defend the PDE against objections. Second, there are legitimate questions about the proportionality condition (4). By what standard do we determine that the good effect of the military action is sufficiently desirable to compensate for permitting (though not intending) the bad effect? And is this standard feasible to apply given the often chaotic and swiftly moving circumstances of warfare?