Provisional Responses to the Problem of Dirty Hands
In what follows, I’ll address some responses to the problem of dirty hands (PoDH), which I presented here. I’ll provide nine replies, though there might well be more. These replies are provisional; I don’t claim that any of them is a definitive solution.
I will assume moral realism, that is, the thesis that there are moral facts, such as facts about what makes some actions morally right and others wrong, about actions that are permissible, impermissible, obligatory, etc., and about what persons ought and ought not do. I will not explore antirealist replies such as emotivism, prescriptivism, or nihilism.* In addition, I will assume moral objectivism. I will not explore subjectivist or relativist replies.** Though I will say something about Sartre.
First, one might be a consequentialist/utilitarian and say that the overall balance of results generated by unintentionally though foreseeably harming the first group (the civilians) is good. Hence, the leader’s authorization of military activity is morally permissible and even obligatory.
One strength of this view is that it provides a supposedly simple solution (or perhaps dissolution) to the PoDH. The leader’s hands are not dirty. He does the morally right and obligatory thing by authorizing the action. One weakness of this view is that it seems too easy. One might object on strong non-consequentialist grounds that some actions are absolutely morally wrong regardless of their beneficial results. Arguably, the military activity and its resultant carnage is morally impermissible, even if foreseen but unintended.
Second, one might be a non-consequentialist and assert that some acts are absolutely morally wrong, regardless of their beneficial results, and moreover, that harming the first group is absolutely wrong. Thus, it would be morally impermissible for the leader to authorize the military activity, even if the consequences of not authorizing it involve harm to the citizens he is under oath to protect. The leader is not responsible for any harm that comes to them as a result of his decision, since he did not cause the harm and did not intend it, even if he foresaw it. Therefore, he does not wrong his citizens. He is not guilty. Granted, he is responsible for the choice to authorize military action or not, but if he chooses not to authorize, which is the morally right move, his decision is morally acceptable.
One advantage of this response is that it takes a strong position on moral rights. Such rights are inviolable (or so one might argue). Advocates of human rights and staunch deontologists are apt to find this response appealing. And yet the response seems to ignore the intuition that, if the leader’s decision brings harm to his citizens, then he bears responsibility for the harm, and if his decision doesn’t bring harm to the citizens, then he is lucky, which raises a separate problem of moral luck.
Third, one might contend that our moral duties are gradable; some are weightier than others. In the leader’s case, there are conflicting duties, but one overrides the other. These are the alternatives: (i) the positive duty to protect one’s populace and therefore authorize the bombing overrides the negative duty not to harm civilians who would be harmed if the bombing were authorized; hence, the leader ought to authorize the activity; and (ii) the negative duty not to harm civilians outweighs the positive duty to protect one’s populace; consequently, the leader ought not authorize the bombing. In short, either (i) outweighs (ii) or vice versa. The leader should select the weightier duty.
Fourth, one might appeal to the principle of double effect (PDE). I will discuss this option in a separate post.
Fifth, one might suspect that things are more complicated than the previous responses indicate. The moral realm is not so straightforward. Even if moral duties are gradable, (i) and (ii) are equally weighty. Either alternative involves the leader in objective moral wrongdoing and therefore he can’t avoid getting his hands dirty. Indeed, for whatever option he chooses, it appears he does both right and not right – which seems contradictory. And yet he must select an option. Perhaps he takes on the responsibility of getting his hands dirty on behalf of his people so they don’t need to assume guilt themselves. Maybe he is the substitutionary wrongdoer for his people. Or maybe not. After all, it might well be the case that (at least some of) the citizens are responsible for endorsing the leader.
A benefit of this response is that it takes the consequentialist and non-consequentialist intuitions of the PoDH seriously. On might think that, on this reply, neither intuition is explained away too quickly. A weakness of this response is that it seems to require accepting a contradiction, which doesn’t solve the problem but instead raises questions about how contradictory claims can be true. Perhaps the problem is insoluble: the world contains such moral absurdities, and we must accept it. Or perhaps the problem is soluble by beings who are epistemically superior to us, but we are not cognitively equipped to solve the problem.
Sixth, one could deny that Option 1 (authorizing the activity) is a moral duty; rather, it is a practical duty of statecraft which trumps all moral duties. Hence, moral duties can be overridden. The leader ought to authorize military action, and he is not guilty of whatever unintended bad results occur, since practical duties of state override moral duties such as not harming non-combatants.
Seventh, one can deny that Option 1 is a moral duty; it is a practical duty of statecraft. However, moral duties trump obligations of state and thus the leader ought not authorize the action. Responses 6 and 7 seem to provide clear solutions, but they rest on a distinction between moral and practical duties of state that one might reasonably reject.
Eighth, one might appeal to the political realist and claim that morality is suspended in cases of war. Inter arma silent leges. In war, the law falls silent. In other words, during warfare, the dictates of morality are prorogued and therefore not binding.
While this response might be appealing to those who desire to conduct the affairs of war without the inconvenience of moral constraints, the response is dubious. Why should morality not apply to war? What sufficient reason is there to hold this position?
Ninth, one might take a Sartrean existentialist position. As Sartre wrote: “Man is condemned to be free. Condemned, because he did not create himself, yet, in other respects is free; because once thrown into the world, he is responsible for everything he does.” (Existentialism and Human Emotions, Citadel Press, 1987, p. 23) Sartre provides the example of his student who faced conflicting duties: leave his elderly mother and fight in World War II, or avoid the fight and care for his mother. What should the young man do? Sartre: “You’re free; choose, that is, invent. No general ethics can show you what is to be done.” (p. 28)
We can imagine that, for the Sartrean, the head of state is in a similar position. Like us all, he is forlorn, condemned to be free and hence responsible, and yet lacking any ethical guidelines. He must choose and take responsibility for his choice, but neither alternative is, objectively speaking, what he should choose.
Sartre raises a profound problem which I can’t discuss thoroughly here. I will only say that, in short, he hasn’t proven his case, neither philosophically nor practically.
*On moral antirealism, objective morality is not real: there are no moral facts; there are no objective moral values or duties; there is no objective guilt. Hence, neither of the leader’s options is morally right, wrong, justified, unjustified, permissible, impermissible, or obligatory. The leader can choose, but the choice is not moral, and his reasons are not moral. In other words, any reason the leader has for/against Option 1 or for/against Option 2 is a non-moral reason because there are no such things as moral reasons. According to the antirealist, the leader cannot do anything morally right or wrong because there is no such thing as objective moral rightness or wrongness.
*On moral subjectivism, whether or not the leader’s action is morally acceptable is relative to each individual’s mere opinion. If Jones believes the action is acceptable, then it is acceptable-for-Jones. If Smith believes the action is unacceptable, then it is unacceptable-for-Smith. Ditto regarding anyone else who has an opinion on the subject. But there is no non-subjective truth about whether or not the leader is morally justified in his decision. On moral relativism, whether or not the leader’s action is morally acceptable is relative to the dominant opinion of a given society. I will not discuss these views any further.