Wisdom and Grief
In Book Four, Section IV of Tusculan Disputations, Cicero introduces the view that the wise person is not subject to the mental state of grief nor to any “perturbation of mind.” On this view, the wise person does not grieve, i.e., the suggestion is that grief is inconsistent with wisdom.[1] I want to challenge this position.
Suppose that wisdom requires the adjustment of mind to the relevant circumstances such that if there is some state of affairs objectively worthy of (reasonable) grief and the wise person is aware of this state of affairs, then the wise person will have a proper mental state with respect to it. This seems a plausible assumption. If it’s correct, the Stoic position appears to rest on the presupposition that there are no states of affairs worthy of reasonable grief. And this presupposition seems implausible to me. On axiological realism, values and disvalues are objectively real. Something that is valuable is objectively worthy of our attitudes of approval, endorsement, valuing, etc. Something of disvalue is objectively unworthy of our approval and perhaps merits our (reasonable) attitudes of disapproval, disdain, grief, etc.
Given points made in Book Three, however, it is possible that by “grief” Cicero was referring to such maudlin gestures as thoughtlessly grasping and squeezing one’s head, pulling at one’s hair and face, beating one’s head and hands against a wall, whining and griping and wailing, etc. Such acts involve oversentimentality: even if they begin as grief, they slide into the histrionic. The wise person does not engage in such emoting.
Arguably, there is a rational and appropriate kind of grief suitable to some situations. The wise person would understand such grief and be open to it.
[1] It’s important to note that Cicero was inclined toward Academic skepticism and thus held (provisionally) that no substantive philosophical position is demonstrable with epistemic certainty. Rather, given human fallibility, all positions should be explored rigorously but non-dogmatically; one may accept provisionally the position he finds most probable (probabilitas) given the relevant evidence while continuing to inquire. This is wise advice, in my view. Given Cicero’s skepticism, one should not conclude that Cicero accepted dogmatically this Stoic position on grief.