Recently, I was reading through my son’s Civics text. In a lesson on the different kinds of government, I read (a): “Americans and people in some other countries prefer democratic government.” Then I found (b): “The “best” form of government is an opinion that differs from one culture to another.”
Now, there’s a lot to say here. I’ll just mention a few points.
First, the grammar of (b) is awkward. There is something like a category mistake. Form of government is not a species of opinion. Government kind is not a kind of belief, as an apple is a kind of fruit. Here’s a better articulation: “Opinions about the best form of government differ from one culture to another.”
Second, the improved statement remains unclear. One can read it as a descriptive claim that beliefs about the best form of government vary relative to culture, even if there is a best form despite the disagreement. Let’s call this the descriptive meaning (DM).
Or one can read the statement according to a relativistic meaning (RM): for all axiological propositions about government, the truth of such propositions is relative to the prevalent opinion in a given society; hence, if the majority view in Society A is that democracy is the best form of government, then that view is true for and within A, but if the majority view in B is that monarchy is best, then that claim is true for and within B; such claims have no truth value independent of the prevailing attitude of some society.
One could also read the statement according to a nihilistic meaning (NM): for all value utterances about government (or anything else), such utterances are false, since value does not exist objectively and thus such utterances do not correspond to anything real; they are merely expressions of emotion, taste, or some similar attitude. On this view, de gustibus non est disputandum.
Lastly, one could read the statement according to an incomparabilist meaning (IM): values are objectively real, but they do not stand in relations of better than, worse than, or equal to; hence, though opinions about the best form of government differ from culture to culture, these opinions are false, since no form of government is better or worse than any other.
Given the tone of the textbook section, I suspect the author had something like RM in mind. On this view, as with other axiological claims, the truth of claims about the best form of government is relative to the dominant beliefs of the societies in which those claims are made. Yet the author didn’t support this debatable assertion with an argument. Rather, he merely asserted it (in a school text for kids!) as if it were as obvious as “2+2=4.”
I want to ask him: “So, do you believe that there is no (non-subjective, non-relative, society-independent) moral or axiological difference between living in a democracy and living in a totalitarian state? Suppose the following is true about the totalitarian state: (i) you are not permitted to do anything whatsoever unless the government expressly allows you to do so; (ii) you must work any job the government tells you to work, even if it is utterly dehumanizing; (iii) you are not permitted to seek an education, access the internet, or read books the government has not authorized; and (iv) you must practice the religion that the government mandates, and only that religion. Do you really believe that such a government is objectively no worse than a free and democratic state?”
I suspect that, if I were to ask this question, the author would deny that there is no objective moral or axiological difference between the states. If he doesn’t deny it in words, he likely denies it in practice.
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