The Problem of Concessive Knowledge Ascriptions
The fallibilist (i.e., the one who holds that propositional knowledge is consistent with fallible justification and hence doesn’t require epistemic certainty) is burdened with explaining the awkwardness of concessive knowledge ascriptions (CKA) of the form “I know that p but I might be wrong that p.” Now, here’s the uneasy factor: if Jones knows that p and yet might be wrong that p, then p might be false. The problem becomes evident if we note that knowledge is factive; that is, knowledge entails truth. If Jones knows that p, then p is true. The CKA is, therefore, this: “I know that p, and thus p is true, but p might be false.” This sentence seems to involve a contradiction. If p is true, then p is not false. How, then, is it the case that p might be false?
The infallibilist (i.e., the one who holds that propositional knowledge requires epistemic certainty) doesn’t have this problem. For cases in which he has knowledge, he can say consistently: “I know that p, and hence p is true and thus not false.”
The fallibilist might respond that he using the epistemic might; what he means is: “I know that p, and thus p is true, but for all I know, p is false.” But this doesn’t work. If he really knows that p, then it’s not the case that, for all he knows, p is false. After all, some of what he knows is precisely that p. Hence, when he appeals to his storehouse of knowledge by saying “for all I know,” he is already admitting that the storehouse contains p, and thus that p is true – which leaves no logical space for the epistemic possibility for him that p is false.
The fallibilist might reply that it’s logically possible that p is false in cases in which p is a contingent truth. Given this point, the fallibilist might adjust his response by claiming that he means: “I know that (contingent) p, and thus (contingent) p is true, but there is some possible world in which (contingent) p is false.” But this doesn’t work either. CKAs are not admissions that contingent propositions known in the actual world are false in some possible worlds. The infallibilist may agree. CKAs are not about such modal issues. Rather, they are claims about fallible justification, namely, that it is possible to know propositions based on fallible justification which, in the actual world, might turn out false because of insufficiently strong justification, matters of veritic luck, etc. In other words, the fallibilist seems to say something like this: “I reasonably take myself to know that p on the basis of plausible but fallible justification, but given this fallibleness combined with instances of veritic luck à la Gettier cases, p could turn out to be false, in which case I would need to withdraw my knowledge claim.” But this admission seems much different from a straightforward and clear knowledge claim. Arguably, the admission is not a knowledge claim but rather an epistemic venture – which by definition involves risk. What kind of risk? The risk is that the venture fails to acquire a true belief. The fallibilist doesn’t really know that p, but instead might have a fallibly justified true belief that p IF p turns out to be true – which might well be beyond his control.
The infallibilist faces no such set of problems – though I admit the infallibilist has other problems to address, some of which I have addressed elsewhere. In any case, the infallibilist can argue against the fallibilist as follows:
If fallibilism is true, then there is a reasonable explanation for the apparent contradictoriness and awkwardness of such CKA.
But there is no such reasonable explanation.
Therefore, fallibilism is not true.