The Ethics of Taking Offense
These days, in many cases, the disfavored consequences of a statement are taken as sufficient for moral guilt. The intent of the speaker is thought irrelevant. Folks no longer mind this time-honored principle: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty unless the mind is also guilty). If Jones takes offense at Smith’s statement, though Smith intended no offense, Smith is considered guilty – even if Jones is unreasonably offended.
The Kantian rejects this unsettling consequentialist trend. In addition to being generally unfair to Smith, the trend violates the dignity of Smith as an end (i.e., a person), and perhaps reduces Smith to a mere means to the end of satisfying Jones’ zeal to express moral indignation.
Arguably, this drift also encourages the violation of Jones’ autonomy. Rather than carefully thinking about Smith’s statement and choosing a morally appropriate response or non-response, Jones reacts heteronomously, thereby being governed by something other than reason and autonomous will. Jones is thus reduced to an instrument (e.g., of desire, of sociocultural influence) rather than a rational and free agent.
Here is a good introductory lecture on Kant’s moral philosophy. Michael Sandel delivers the lecture.