Socrates on Life After Death
According to Plato in The Apology, Socrates argues that there is reason to hope that death is a good and thus that we shouldn’t fear it. The argument is as follows:
Either death is (a) like a permanent dreamless sleep, or death is (b) an abiding conscious experience which enables one to continue philosophizing. If (a), death is good. If (b), death is good. Hence, in either case, death is good. But we shouldn’t fear that which is good. Thus, we shouldn’t fear death.
One might articulate the argument more substantively in this way:
Either death is (a) the permanent cessation of conscious life or (b) a perpetuation of conscious life which enables one to continue philosophizing in such a way as to avoid the bad experiences of the pre-mortem predicament and to gain knowledge one did not acquire before death.
If (a), then death is good in the sense of ending permanently the bad experiences of the pre-mortem predicament. (Call this Sense 1)
If (b), then death is good in the sense of enabling one to continue philosophizing with righteous and wise persons who have also died, to do so sans the bad experiences of the pre-mortem predicament, and thereby to obtain knowledge. (Call this Sense 2)
Therefore, either death is good in Sense 1 or in Sense 2.
We shouldn’t fear that which is good.
Therefore, we shouldn’t fear death.
This is a valid deductive argument via a rule of logic called constructive dilemma. It’s no surprise that Socrates offered a valid argument given his dialectical prowess. But is the argument sound? It depends on whether or not the premises are true. Let’s examine them.
Concern 1: One might worry that (1) is a false dilemma. There is at least one more option, namely, (c) death is a continuation of conscious life that involves only or mostly suffering with no opportunity for philosophizing or for gaining knowledge. As Shakespeare has Hamlet ask, what dreams may come when we shuffle off this mortal coil?
Concern 2: One might also worry that (2) is false because, although it is true that the permanent cessation of conscious life would end the bad experiences of pre-mortem life, such cessation would also end any possibility for good experiences in the future. Indeed, one might plausibly argue that consciousness itself is an intrinsic good (though some of its objects, i.e., some of what it is conscious of, are bad) and that the destruction of an intrinsic good is intrinsically bad. One might then believe that death is intrinsically bad but that it results in at least two effects: the good effect of ending bad experiences and the bad effect of ending good experiences.
I find (3) acceptable. It seems to me that if death is (b), then death is not bad because it does not end consciousness, but instead prolongs it in such a way as to enable the acquisition of other intrinsic goods such as knowledge, wisdom, philosophical examination, and friendships with wise persons.
How might Socrates, or someone attempting to defend his argument, respond to these objections?
Regarding the first objection, we might point to evidence in the text that Socrates was arguing that death is good for those who seek truth and goodness, and hence such people shouldn’t fear death. He says in The Apology and elsewhere that “no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death.” We might then reasonably modify Socrates’ argument as such:
(i) Either death for a seeker of truth and goodness is (a) the permanent cessation of conscious life or (b) the perpetuation of conscious life which enables one to continue philosophizing in such a way as to avoid the bad experiences of the pre-mortem predicament and to gain knowledge one did not acquire before death or (c) a continuation of conscious life that involves only or mostly suffering with no opportunity for philosophizing or for gaining knowledge or (d) some similarly bad state.
(ii) Death for a seeker is not (c) or (d).
(iii) Thus, death for the seeker is either (a) or (b).
(iv) If (a), then death for the seeker is good in the sense of ending permanently the bad experiences of pre-mortem life. (Call this Sense 1)
(v) If (b), then death for the seeker is good in the sense of enabling one to continue philosophizing with righteous and wise persons who have also died, to do so sans the bad experiences of pre-mortem life, and thereby to obtain knowledge. (Call this Sense 2)
(vi) Therefore, either death for the seeker is good in Sense 1 or in Sense 2.
(vii) One shouldn’t fear that which is good.
(viii) Therefore, the seeker shouldn’t fear death.
The second concern raised above might appeal to Socrates. He did, as the text indicates (see passage below), hold that the philosophical life is filled with good experiences. We might then modify (2) by saying that if (a), then death is a partial good in the sense that it prevents the bad experiences of pre-mortem life, though it’s a partial bad in the sense that it precludes future conscious experiences, and moreover, it ends something intrinsically good, namely, consciousness itself.
The new argument would look something like this:
A. Either death for a seeker of truth and goodness is (a) the permanent cessation of conscious life or (b) the perpetuation of conscious life which enables one to continue philosophizing in such a way as to avoid the bad experiences of the pre-mortem predicament and to gain knowledge one did not acquire before death or (c) a continuation of conscious life that involves only or mostly suffering with no opportunity for philosophizing or for gaining knowledge or (d) some similarly bad state.
B. Death for a seeker is not (c) or (d).
C. Thus, death for the seeker is either (a) or (b).
D. If (a), then death for the seeker is partially good in the sense of ending permanently the bad experiences of pre-mortem life. (Sense 1)
E. If (b), then death for the seeker is good in the sense of enabling one to continue philosophizing with righteous and wise persons who have also died, to do so sans the bad experiences of pre-mortem life, and thereby to obtain knowledge. (Sense 2)
F. Therefore, either death for the seeker is partially good in Sense 1 or wholly good in Sense 2.
G. One shouldn’t fear that which is good.
H. Therefore, the seeker shouldn’t fear death insofar as it’s either a partial good or a total good.*
*We are still left with the concern that death in Sense 1 involves the bad effect of ending the intrinsic good of consciousness. Sense 1 seems to be partially good and partially bad. The seeker, then, would still have reason to fear the partial badness of death in Sense 1.
Socrates’ argument is fascinating and, I think, can be modified to deal with the objections I raised so that the argument provides the seeker with a reason to hope that death is good for him, that is, either wholly good or partially good. We are left with the following question: How might we respond to the objection that Sense 1 is partially bad?
“Let us reflect in another way, and we shall see that there is great reason to hope that death is a good, for one of two things: either death is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness, or, as men say, there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, but a sleep like the sleep of him who is undisturbed even by the sight of dreams, death will be an unspeakable gain… But if death is the journey to another place, and there, as men say, all the dead are, what good, O my friends and judges, can be greater than this? If indeed when the pilgrim arrives in the world below, he is delivered from the professors of justice in this world, and finds the true judges who are said to give judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and other sons of God who were righteous in their own life, that pilgrimage will be worth making. What would not a man give if he might converse with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? Nay, if this be true, let me die again and again. I, too, shall have a wonderful interest in a place where I can converse with Palamedes, and Ajax the son of Telamon, and other heroes of old, who have suffered death through an unjust judgment; and there will be no small pleasure, as I think, in comparing my own sufferings with theirs. Above all, I shall be able to continue my search into true and false knowledge; as in this world, so also in that; I shall find out who is wise, and who pretends to be wise, and is not. What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine the leader of the great Trojan expedition; or Odysseus or Sisyphus, or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delight would there be in conversing with them and asking them questions! For in that world they do not put a man to death for this; certainly not. For besides being happier in that world than in this, they will be immortal, if what is said is true.”