Politicians, Knowledge, and Belief
With respect to the blunder about WMD in Iraq, Tony Blair once said: “I only know what I believe.” This is an epistemologically interesting statement in several respects.
First, let’s recognize that he used this claim as a way of admitting that he was wrong, i.e., that he formed a belief on the basis of “instinct” rather than adequate evidence. Now, there are at least three ways to read a claim of the type Blair uttered.
If I know that p, then I believe that p.
I have self-awareness regarding my own beliefs.
I merely believed that p, but I didn’t know that p since my belief was both false and lacking sufficient evidence. I was thus epistemically irresponsible for believing that p. For this violation of my epistemic duty, I apologize.
Quite plausibly, Blair did not mean (1), though (1) is perhaps analytically true, assuming that belief is a necessary condition for propositional knowledge – although maybe there are counterexamples, such as when the gambler knows that he will not win the next bet, yet convinces himself “If I just place one more bet, I believe that I will win!”
And it is probable that Blair didn’t mean (2), although it is worth noting that those who have self-knowledge tend to be aware of what they believe, at least on important issues such as the one at hand. The ancient maxim nosce te ipsum (know thyself) is relevant here.
Given Blair’s contrite tone and use of “apologise,” he likely meant something like (3). How refreshing it would be for a politician to say something as precise and philosophically insightful as (3)!
*Notice that Blair apologized for the evidence that “turned out to be wrong” but he did not apologize for his own epistemic mistakes (e.g., mishandling the evidence, forming a false belief, etc.), nor did he apologize for the actions he took on the basis of his false belief.