Political Libertarianism and Tacit Consent
Some libertarians have claimed that particular forms of taxation — e.g., those designed to fund public welfare programs — entail the unjust seizure of personal property, i.e., theft. In other words, these kinds of taxation do not include the proper consent of the taxpayer insofar as proper consent must be explicitly given. Thus, such taxation is a matter of coercion, unfairly depriving owners of their property to redistribute it to others with no right to possess it. Moreover, this coercive practice involves treating persons as mere means to desired social ends, which violates Kant’s categorical imperative. How? The state forces taxpayers to devote to it a portion of their labor for the sake of bringing about particular social ends which the state selects.
One objection to these libertarian concerns is that people who choose to continue residing in a society whose government imposes redistributive taxes thereby tacitly consent to these taxes. This tacit acceptance justifies the tax. After all, so the objection goes, if a resident is free to leave the jurisdiction which is responsible for such taxation and take up residence in a better one, the resident’s decision to remain suggests an endorsement of that political entity and consequently of its policies. Therefore, neither is the tax unjust nor is the taxpayer treated as a mere means. I will call this the free-to-emigrate (FTE) objection.
I’d like to present several replies to the FTE objection.[1] As far as I know, these replies are my contribution to the dialectic. I have not seen them addressed elsewhere, though others might have discussed them. Such is philosophy, I suppose. In any case, I will keep my comments succinct, as befits a post like this.
First, the FTE objection seems to involve the fallacy of division. Let us assume arguendo that the FTE objector is correct that resident R’s decision to remain in state S suggests R’s endorsement of S. From the fact that S has the characteristic of being endorsed by R, it doesn’t follow that each part or aspect of S possesses the same characteristic. R might approve of S as a whole but not support policy P of S. R’s endorsement of S thus does not entail R’s consent to S’s redistributive tax policies. I will call this the division response to FTE.
Second, it is debatable whether or not R’s remaining in S entails R’s endorsement of S. R might be, in principle, free to leave S but practically unable to do so. R’s leaving S might not be feasible for R. Why not? R might not be financially able to leave S. R might be rooted in S because of family or friendship obligations or a sense of legitimate patriotism. R might be psychologically attached to S in some way that makes leaving S infeasible for R. I will call this the infeasibility response to FTE.
Third, many nations – including the U. S. – are welfare states to some degree. And given ideas such as American exceptionalism, Wilsonian idealism, and globalization for the sake of spreading the values of democratic welfare-statism, the options for emigration to a nation that does not impose redistributive taxation are slim. There appears to be an inverse relationship between (a) successful, Western-style globalization and (b) the scope of nations that do not use redistributive taxation. As the former grows, the latter shrinks. And the former is growing. Even if R were willing to emigrate to avoid the redistributive tax policy (RTP) of S, it seems there are no practical means of escape from the kinds of taxes libertarians view as unjust. If R takes up residence in any other state S*, it is likely that S* will impose a tax policy relevantly similar to RTP. I will call this the no-escape response to FTE.
Lastly, an axiological response: the claim that R is free to leave S for some better state S’ presupposes that states stand in axiological relations of better than and worse than with respect to each other. Why think this?
Suppose we grant that states stand in better than/worse than relations. These relations must hold with respect to some comparative factor. Is S’ better than S with respect to its lack of redistributive tax policies? Perhaps so. But there are other factors of comparison to consider. Which state is better concerning economic health? Physical health? Psychological well-being? Human flourishing? Climate? Community relations? Freedom of speech, movement, conscience, etc.? Quality of roads and infrastructure? The rule of law? Employment opportunities? Problems with overcrowding? And so on.
Suppose there is one state, S+, that is better than S regarding all pertinent factors of consideration. In terms of combinatorial optimization, S+ wins the prize. Why think that we humans have the cognitive capacity to figure out reliably which state counts as S+? Exercises in combinatorial optimization can be quite complicated. Suppose there are too many factors to consider and far too many possible combinations of such aspects. What if we cannot know if S+ is better than S, all things considered? What if we can’t know which state counts as S+?
I tentatively conclude that the FTE objection is unpersuasive. The libertarian has reasons to conclude that, as Nozick quipped, “tacit consent isn’t worth the paper it’s not written on.” (Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, 1974, 287.)
[1] My compound rejoinder to the FTE objection does not entail my endorsement of political libertarianism.