One Problem of Seeing Through a Glass Darkly
Let me see if I can identify the problem by articulating an aporetic triad.
We ought to make the most important decisions of human life on the basis of a clear understanding of all the relevant information.
Ought implies can.
We can’t obtain a clear understanding of all the relevant information (i.e., we see through a glass darkly. See Plato in Phaedo and St. Paul in 1 Cor. 13:12, both of whom use the metaphor of “seeing through a glass darkly”).
Each of these propositions is plausible, and yet they cannot all be true. If any two are true, the third is false. Which do you deny?
I’m inclined to deny (1). We ought to make the most important life decisions in the most reasonable manner that we can manage, but given the weaknesses of the human epistemic condition, we cannot make such choices based on a clear understanding of all the relevant information. Rather, at best, our decisions are based on a somewhat less than lucid grasp of some items in the set of relevant information combined with perhaps a complete ignorance of some of the other items in the set.
The significance of a denial of (1) is quite interesting. For one thing, we should not be judged for our decisions according to the standard of complete understanding of all the pertinent information. Instead, we should be judged on the standard of doing what is feasible for us, namely, to decide in the most reasonable manner we can manage – which might vary from person to person. For another thing, it seems that our lack of understanding is part of the human predicament. We are stuck and need help. The stickiness of our existential bog is partly explained by our own cognitive limitations. There is an existentialist point here that I might explore later.