On the Symmetry Argument Regarding Death
Consider the symmetry argument (SA) against taking a negative attitude (e.g., one of fear, discontentment, aversion, etc.) regarding death. The SA is associated with thinkers such as Lucretius and Hume.
The SA can be articulated as an analogical argument. Such arguments are inductive in nature and have the following form.
Things G and F share features w, x, and y.
G has z.
Thus, probably, F has z.
The probability in (3) increases or decreases depending on the number of relevant features shared by G and F: the more features in common, the higher the probability. Moreover, any pertinent property that G possesses but F lacks, or vice versa, weakens the analogy.
Here is an example of an analogical argument.
A car and a bicycle have seats, pedals, wheels, mobility, and steering mechanisms.
A car can be used for transportation.
Thus, probably, a bicycle can be used for transportation.
Here is a version of the SA.
During the prenatal and postmortem states in relation to a person’s life, that person does not exist.
Prenatal nonexistence does not harm the person who begins to exist at conception (or birth, or some time between).
Therefore, probably, postmortem nonexistence does not harm the person who dies and thus ceases to exist.
Whatever does not harm a person is not reasonably feared.
Hence, prenatal nonexistence is not reasonably feared, and (probably) postmortem nonexistence is not reasonably feared.
Thus, probably, postmortem nonexistence is not reasonably feared.
Note that (I) presupposes the termination thesis (TT), which holds that death terminates one’s existence. The TT is open to objection, but let’s assume it arguendo. (I) also presupposes that one does not exist prior to one’s conception (birth, etc.) Let’s assume this point as well. Moreover, (II) is questionable: although perhaps prenatal nonexistence doesn’t exactly harm us, is there no adequate reason to desire existence before one’s birth? Can one construct an argument that one would have been better off living in the distant past? I’ll return to this point.*
For now, consider what seems to be a strong objection to the SA. There is a crucial disanalogy between prenatal and postmortem nonexistence: the latter involves a deprivation of something valuable, namely, life.** The former does not involve this deprivation. When Smith dies, he loses his life, but he didn’t lose his life prior to being born. Consequently, the comparison in SA is weak. After all, many people who fear death fear being deprived of their life rather than fearing mere nonexistence. The SA ignores this point. Arguably, it is reasonable to fear the loss of something valuable. If the dying person’s life is valuable, then it is reasonable to fear losing it, desire not to lose it, etc.
Here is another way to put the argument. Consider the like cases principle, which holds that relevantly like cases ought to be treated alike. We’ll call this the like cases argument (LCA):
Relevantly like cases ought to be treated alike. Prenatal and postmortem cases are relevantly alike with respect to nonexistence. Hence, they ought to be treated alike with respect to nonexistence. One ought not fear or have any aversion to not existing prior to one’s birth. Therefore, one ought not fear or have any aversion to not existing after one’s death.
The LCA is open to the objection we raised against the SA: the analogy is weak. The prenatal and postmortem cases are not relevantly alike with respect to nonexistence. At death, one is deprived of life, and so the postmortem case involves deprivation. But the prenatal case does not involve deprivation.
*Might there be a good reason to desire existence before one’s birth? Is there a reasonable fear of missing out (FOMO), or better: discontentment about missing out (DAMO)?
Suppose you are an excellent artist. You practice painting and sculpture. You live in a philistine time during which nobody recognizes the values of fine art and nobody supports your artistic endeavors. Would you not be reasonable to desire to live, say, in Italy during the Renaissance period or France during the Realist period? If you were to live during one of those times, or during some other time in which there was greater appreciation for the fine arts, then your life might be better.
Suppose that 100 years from now there are no more competitive sports. And yet a man exists with the athletic talent and competetive zeal of Michael Jordan. The man has no outlet for his talent and drive. He learns that, 100 years ago, people played competitive basketball, and some made a living doing so. Wouldn’t it be reasonable for the man to desire to live a century earlier?
But does it make sense to wish to have been alive during a previous period of history? Would such a case require that your parents had lived during that prior time, that they had procreated at the right moment in order to beget you, etc.? Would it be possible for such things to happen? Here, some serious metaphysical questions arise concerning time, causation, the generation of personhood, personal identity, etc. In the tradition of Christian philosophy and theology, inquiries about traducianism and creationism are germane.
I’ll leave such heavy lifting for another day. I already have enough to work with in this blog post.
**I am assuming that human life – which is a conscious and rational form of life – has positive value. Some might object, and thus my assumption would benefit from a defense, though I can’t do so hic et nunc.
Dostoyevsky’s Underground Man seems to deny the postive value of human life, claiming that consciousness is a disease. (Notes from Underground, New York: Bantam Classics, April 2005, pp. 4-5) But the Underground Man is an unreliable narrator, admitting in the first sentence of the novella that he is a “sick and spiteful man.” (p. 1)
Schopenhauer also denies the positive value of human life, and he is not an unreliable narrator:
“Human life must be some kind of mistake. The truth of this will be sufficiently obvious if we only remember that man is a compound of needs and necessities hard to satisfy; and that even when they are satisfied all he obtains is a state of painlessness, where nothing remains to him but abandonment to boredom. This is direct proof that existence has no real value in itself; for what is boredom but the feeling of the emptiness of life? If life … were possessed of any positive intrinsic value, there would be no such thing as boredom at all: mere existence would satisfy us in itself, and we should want for nothing.” (The Vanity of Existence)