On ‘Agnosticism’ and its Various Senses: Why it is Possible to be a Theist and a Kind of Agnostic
‘Agnostic’ is an equivocal term. The word derives from the Greek a (not) and gnōstós (known), and in this sense means “not known.” I will call this sense of ‘agnostic’ definition (1), according to which one claims not to know whether or not a proposition is true. For instance, Smith might claim not to know whether intelligent life exists in the Alpha Centauri solar system. But ‘agnostic’ is also used to mean (2) “neither believing nor not believing a proposition” and (3) “neither committing to nor rejecting a system, method, or device.” For example, Jones might neither believe nor disbelieve that there are sasquatches, and Brown might neither commit to using Old Spice deodorant nor reject using it, but instead remain neutral concerning its use. In each case, ‘agnosticism’ indicates a sort of neutrality: in (1), the neutrality is epistemic; in (2), doxastic; and in (3), practical.
With respect to (1), one might claim that he does not know whether or not God exists. Indeed, one might claim that human beings cannot know whether God exists. Still, we can be more precise. Distinguish between propositional knowledge and knowledge-by-acquaintance. The former involves knowing that some proposition is true, e.g., that Tampa is 85 miles southwest of Orlando. The latter is a matter of being directly aware of something, such as the taste of coffee or the sound of a friend’s voice or a pain in one’s lower back. Regarding the question of theism, (1) is thus divided into several kinds of ‘agnostic’:
(1a): a person who claims not to possess propositional knowledge concerning the existence or non-existence of God;
(1b): a person who claims that it is not possible (at least not in this life) for human beings (or perhaps for any finite intellect) to possess propositional knowledge concerning the existence or non-existence of God;
(1c): a person who claims not to possess knowledge-by-acquaintance concerning the existence or non-existence of God;
(1d): a person who claims that it is not possible (at least not in this life) for human beings (or perhaps for any finite intellect) to possess knowledge-by-acquaintance concerning the existence or non-existence of God.
There are also the following senses of ‘agnostic’:
(2) a person who neither believes nor disbelieves that God exists;
(3) a person who neither commits to nor rejects a specific theistic religion;
(4) a person who neither commits to nor rejects a specific theistic religious ritual or practice.
No doubt there are further distinctions concerning ‘agnostic.’ Let’s set these aside for now and consider the seven senses of ‘agnostic’ above and how they relate to the question of theism.
Now, (1a) and (1b) are each consistent with theism (i.e., the belief that God exists). Indeed, each is consistent with reasonable theism since one might believe that God exists, believe so on the basis of adequate reason, and yet neither know that God exists nor know that God doesn’t exist. Given my inclinations concerning the nature of propositional knowledge, which I have published here in an article entitled Why Fallibilistic Evidence is Insufficient for Propositional Knowledge, and also here, knowledge requires epistemic certainty. Since in our pre-mortem state we cannot possess epistemic certainty regarding God’s existence or non-existence, we cannot know (propositionally) that God exists or that God does not exist. And yet one can support one’s theistic belief or atheistic belief on the basis of an adequate reason.
For my part, I am a theist, and my theism rests on arguments which I take to secure sufficiently probable though not epistemically certain justification for theism. (See here and here for a host of adequate arguments for theism. Regarding atheism, I find that the probabilistic argument from gratuitous evil is a reasonable argument for atheism - though it doesn’t prove atheism.) It is therefore fair to call me a theist who is agnostic in the senses of (1a) and (1b), though I am not agnostic in the sense of (2), since by definition being a theist excludes being agnostic in sense (2) — that is, if ‘theism’ is a matter of believing that God exists. [1] (Note: Sense (2) is probably the most common meaning of ‘agnostic’ with respect to the question of theism.)
Moreover, in my view, every theist is agnostic in senses (1a) and (1b), though I suspect many theists would disagree and instead claim to possess propositional knowledge that God exists. [2] To such folks, I would respond that they don’t have epistemic certainty, and thus, by “propositional knowledge,” they mean something weaker than what I mean, such as mere fallibly justified true belief (FJTB). They would then face the dreaded Gettier Problem; I would hence ask them how they have managed to cage that beast.
In any case, (1a) and (1b) are each compatible with theism. I’ll call this position epistemically agnostic theism (EAT) and claim that every theist falls into this category, at least for those of us who are human and pre-mortem. (1a) and (1b) are also compatible with (2), though theism — defined in terms of belief that God exists — is not consistent with (2).
What about (3)? To specify (3), take a particular religion such as Christianity. (1a) and (1b) each cohere with (3). By the way, as far as I’m aware, neither Christianity nor any other religion requires for membership purposes that its adherents hold that theism is known or knowable, nor does any religion require that its adherents claim that they obtain propositional knowledge that the religion is true. (2) and (3) are also consistent. And theism is compatible with (3).
How about (4)? Consider a religious ritual such as the Hindu practice of punyaham (ritualistic cleansing). (1a) and (1b) are each consistent with (4). (2) coheres with (4). (3) is also compatible with (4).
Now, (1a) and/or (1b) can relate to (2) in some interesting ways. The EAT holds (or ought to hold) (1a) and (1b) and yet must deny (2), given his theism. The epistemically agnostic doxastic agnostic (EADA) holds (1a) and (1b) and also (2). Supposedly following Pyrrho, the ancient Pyrrhonists seem to fit the category of EADA. They suspended judgment about matters of philosophy and theology, though they also seemed to have been willing to make practical commitments in the areas of religion, politics, etc., and thus were not necessarily agnostic in the senses of (3) and (4). Apparently, at least some Pyrrhonists held (believed?) that they could achieve the goal of ataraxia (equanimity, tranquility, peace of mind) by practicing the suspension of belief. An important question arises here about whether it is problematic to believe that one can attain peace of mind by suspending belief and at the same time put this belief into successful practice. If the Pyrronhist suspends all beliefs about matters of philosophy, can he consistently believe that he can attain tranquility by doing so? Wouldn’t he also need to suspend belief in that Pyrrhonist claim? I suppose it depends on various factors concerning the nature of belief and practice that I cannot pursue here. In any case, I should also note that one can be a consistent atheist while holding (1a) and/or (1b). In my view, all atheists are agnostics in the (1a)/(1b) sense, since no atheist strictly knows that God does not exist. We can call this taxonomic group epistemically agnostic atheism (EAA).
Thus far in my consistency analysis, I have left unaddressed senses (1c) and (1d). How do these factor into the analysis? Though this is a significant question, alas, I must table it for now. Practical duties call. You might continue the analysis if you are motivated to do so.
[1] Perhaps one could define ‘theism’ in terms of committing to a theistic way of life which involves reasonable hope, acting as if, and the like but without requiring the strict belief that God exists. This is an interesting point which I will set aside for now.
[2] Indeed, as I see it, every mere human being in this life is agnostic in senses (1a) and (1b). But with respect to theists, I should be more precise by saying that every theist who is a finite intellect is agnostic in senses (1a) and (1b). If there is a God in the sense of a Perfect Being, then God is presumably a theist, and yet since God is omniscient, infallible, and necessarily such, God knows infallibly that he exists and therefore is not agnostic in senses (1a) and (1b). An interesting question arises here: What about Jesus? Suppose that the doctrine of the hypostatic union is correct and hence that Jesus has both a divine nature and a human nature. In other words, Jesus is truly God and truly man. Suppose also that during his human sojourn, Jesus operated according to his human nature. With respect to his human nature, did Jesus know with epistemic certainty that God exists? Did he know that he was God? These are fascinating questions that I must set aside for now.