Obstinacy and Closed-mindedness
In this post, I noted that open-mindedness is the rational mean between the vices of gullibility (i.e., credulity) and obstinacy. Closed-mindedness is a synonym of obstinacy, and thus one can think of open-mindedness as the Aristotelian place of wisdom between gullibility and closed-mindedness.
Yet it seems there is a subtle distinction between obstinacy and closed-mindedness. According to thefreedictionary.com, being obstinate is a matter of “stubbornly adhering to an attitude, opinion, or course of action,” and being closed-minded is a matter of being “stubbornly unreceptive to new ideas.” Depending on the meaning of ‘stubborn,’ one can be receptive to a new idea about x and yet stubbornly adhere to one’s idea about x. Suppose that to be stubborn is to be unwilling to change one’s belief that p. Jones is willing to listen to new ideas about p, but since these ideas are dubious, and Jones knows that p, Jones is unwilling to change his belief that p because he is unwilling to trade his knowledge for ignorance. Generally, knowledge is better than ignorance. Why should Jones relinquish his belief that p, given he knows that p and the arguments for ~p are unsatisfactory?
But now suppose that to be stubborn is to be unwilling to change one’s belief that p despite the availability of good arguments to support the conclusion that ~p. In this case, if Jones believes that p but doesn’t know that p, and if Jones is willing to listen to good arguments for ~p which demonstrate that ~p is true, then (assuming he understands them) Jones should accept such arguments. Thus, if Jones were stubbornly to adhere to the belief that p, his obstinacy would prevent him from obtaining a justified true belief.
It seems that reasonable open-mindedness is a virtue insofar as it enables us to access justified beliefs and justified true beliefs. (There might be other reasons to be open-minded; I am not suggesting the consequentialist view that open-mindedness is made good by its beneficial consequences of truth acquisition.) Similarly, obstinacy and closed-mindedness are vices insofar as they tend to be obstacles to such epistemic goods.
But in some cases, obstinacy and closed-mindedness don’t prevent us from accessing epistemic goods; rather, they help us to avoid trading truth for falsehood. Jones knows with epistemic certainty that two plus two equals four. Smith proposes an argument that two plus two equals nine. If Jones is closed-minded to Smith’s argument, Jones’ closed-mindedness is arguably not a vice. It seems justified and is perhaps a virtue. Similarly, if Jones is willing to listen to Smith’s argument, and Smith’s argument is unconvincing, given that Jones knows with certainty that two plus two equals four, his refusal to change his belief that two plus two equals four is not a vice.