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T’is the season of goodwill toward others. But why be willing to help others?
This question was raised in a somewhat sappy Christmas movie I caught the other day. (Well, I watched roughly the last quarter of the flick.) In a scene near the end, a young woman discusses the reason for the Christmas spirit. She asks the question rhetorically and then answers:
Because it makes us happy.
The filmmakers orchestrated her answer to make it seem enlightened.
The answer suggests two readings of the question: descriptive and normative. Here’s the descriptive reading: Why do we help others? [Because it makes us happy.]
Undoubtedly, many folks have the same answer to the descriptive question. Notice that the question is not about what we should do but concerns what we do and its motivations. The question is about human psychology. The answer appeals to psychological egoism.* The character didn’t seem interested in this question or its answer. She was not psychologizing her audience.
The normative reading is this: Why should we help others? [Because it makes us happy.] The “should” in this question is a moral ought. This seems to have been her question, i.e., the question posed by the filmmakers.
I don’t endorse their answer. Why not? It’s an appeal to self-interest, much like the claim of some religious folks that one should do the right thing for the sake of earning the reward of Heaven, attaining moksha, reaching nirvana, etc. The general position underlying these assertions is that one ought to help others because doing so benefits oneself.
How about helping others because it’s the dutiful thing or the virtuous thing, or because the other is inherently valuable and worthy of care? That is genuine goodwill. But perhaps such benevolence is too pure, that is, too pure to sell in a feel-good movie.
But it’s not too pure to practice in ordinary life. To my mind, it’s just right.
*Psychological egoism is the thesis of psychology that, regarding intentional acts, all human persons are ultimately motivated always and only by self-interest.
But rationality and morality indicate that we should be fair to the egoist. He ought to have a chance to respond. How might he do so?
He might reply as follows; call this the argument from egoism against altruism (AEAA):
It’s a mistake to say that we ought to help one another for the sake of duty or because persons are worthy of care. We are psychologically unable to accomplish such altruism. Hence, it’s not the case that we morally ought to do so. The argument can be put formally as follows:
1. If psychological egoism is true, then it is impossible for us to act altruistically.
2. If it is impossible for us to act altruistically, then we are not morally obligated to do so.
3. Thus, if psychological egoism is true, then we are not morally obligated to act altruistically.
4. Psychological egoism is true.
5. Therefore, we are not morally obligated to act altruistically.
How should we assess AEAA? It’s deductively valid, which means that if its premises are true, its conclusion must also be true (assuming there is no fallacy somewhere in the argument). The premises are (1), (2), and (4). Let’s take them one at a time.
(1) seems true by definition. If our ultimate motives are always and only about self-interest, then we cannot have any other ultimate motive. Thus, altruistic concern as an ultimate reason for action is ruled out.
But psychological egoism, as I have defined it, is not the claim that altruistic action is impossible but only that we always act according to self-interest. Let’s call this weak psychological egoism. For (1) to be true by definition, we needed a stronger version: regarding intentional acts, all human persons must be ultimately motivated always and only by self-interest; we cannot have any other motive. This is strong psychological egoism.
(2) is quite plausible, given the reasonable principle that ought implies can. In other words, for any act a, if one ought to a, then it is possible for one to a. Hence, by contraposition, if it is not possible for one to a, then it is not the case that one ought to a. Now, assuming the principle just explained, if altruistic action is impossible for us, then it’s not the case that we ought to act altruistically.
The problem with AEAA concerns (4). There are good reasons for concluding that psychological egoism is false, both in its strong and weak forms.
It is not true that all human persons are ultimately motivated always and only by self-interest. There is adequate evidence that, at least sometimes and for some persons, we have other final motives, such as doing one’s duty, acting for the sake of virtue, love for others, love for God, etc. Indeed, all we need is one example in the history of human agency of someone acting for any reason other than self-interest to show that weak psychological egoism is false and, thus, that AEAA fails. To refute strong psychological egoism, all we need is one possible example. Psychological egoism is a difficult thesis to maintain because it is vulnerable to just one counterexample, actual or merely possible.
I leave the reader to think about a counterexample.