Examining the Doctrine of the Trinity
The Doctrine of the Trinity (DoT) holds that the one and only God is three divine persons; in other words, there is one being, the only God, and that being exists in three divine persons. Let’s assume that this is a logically coherent position since prima facie, it is not contradictory to say that there is one being that is three persons. (By contrast, it would be a straightforward contradiction to say that there is one being that is three beings or that there is one person who is three persons. And it would be contradictory to say that there is one being existing in three persons if to be a person is always sufficient for being an independent entity; more on this point below.) My purpose here is not to enter the debate about whether or not the DoT is contradictory. Rather, I want to address what appears to be another problem with this doctrine.
God is the greatest metaphysically possible being or, as some have put it, the greatest conceivable being. In Anselm’s words, God is aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit (that than which nothing greater can be conceived). God is the supremely perfect being. But on the DoT, God is such that each divine person is a person whose existence as a person is insufficient to individuate him as an independent being. The independent being is the trinitarian God; none of the three divine persons is himself an ontologically independent entity. (Note: each divine person is a distinct person, but none of the persons are free-standing entities; and if God is necessarily tri-personal, then it is impossible for any of the persons to be free-standing entities.)
Here is the apparent problem: Is it greater to be a personal being, each of whose individual personhoods is insufficient for independent existence? Or is it greater for a personal being to be such that his personhood is sufficient to make him a distinct entity as a person? Presumably, a human person is an independent being such that his personhood is sufficient to individuate him as a distinct being. (Or perhaps not? Perhaps something other than personhood individuates each human person?) But on the DoT, the three divine persons are not their own beings; rather, the individuated being is the tri-personal God.
If the DoT is true, then (assuming God is the supremely perfect being) it is better to be (a) such that one’s singular personhood(s) is insufficient to make one’s person(s) a distinct being, and it is worse to be (b) such that one’s singular personhood is sufficient to individuate him as a distinct being.
Why is (a) better than (b)?
And if each divine person is a person whose existence as a person is insufficient to individuate him as an independent being, does this mean that the divine persons each lack aseity? Is it problematic to affirm a doctrine according to which the tri-personal God possesses aseity, but each of the three divine persons lacks it?