Examining a Definition of ‘Knowledge’
I was taking a faculty training course recently. I came across this definition of ‘knowledge’: “acquired true information resulting in understanding.” Although it is unclear what “information” refers to, I think it is plausible to substitute ‘proposition.’ Hence, we seem to have a decent start toward an essential/analytic definition of propositional knowledge.
For one thing, the truth factor is covered. Knowledge is factive. In other words, knowledge entails truth; if S knows that p, then p is true.
It is not altogether clear what “acquired” refers to, but one might claim prima facie that ‘belief’, ‘assent’, or something similar is a reasonable substitute. Most epistemologists agree that if S knows that p, then S believes that p. (One might question this point. Take the curious case of folks who seem to know that p and yet believe that ~p, such as the gambler who knows she won’t win yet believes she will win, or the person who believes that he is something which he knows he isn’t.) If ‘acquired’ means ‘believed,’ then the belief factor is also covered.
There is a problem, however. One can make a plausible argument on the basis of vocabulary that there is a difference between acquiring a proposition and believing it. The former requires only accessing and remembering the relevant information sufficiently for recall. The latter requires affirmation, i.e., to believe that p is to take p to be true or to assent to p. For instance, a scholar of religion might learn about and thus acquire information concerning the tenets of Buddhism but not believe those tenets. If ‘acquire’ does not mean ‘belief’ in this case, then the belief factor is missing, which counts as a strike against the definition.
Now for another problem: the definition does not refer to any sort of justification. It is commonly held by epistemologists that propositional knowledge requires rational justification, a key factor without which one might gain a true belief with the fortuitous help of Lady Luck. Sans justification, one does not possess knowledge.
Lastly, it is not clear that knowledge results in or entails understanding. Epistemologists have done a good deal of work on the concept of ‘understanding.’ At this point, there is an open question regarding how understanding and knowledge are related. The jury is out.
Our definition, then, is provisional at best. It needs further work.