Epistemic Autonomy and Open Inquiry
A Summary of Maura Priest’s ‘Professional Philosophy Has an Epistemic Autonomy Problem'
*I drafted this short article for the Reading Corner at Purdue University Global, where I teach philosophy. The Reading Corner is a peer-reviewed internal publication at Purdue.
The article is a summary and short commentary on Priest’s Professional Philosophy Has an Epistemic Autonomy Problem. I found the article to be an interesting evaluation of the state of professional philosophy concerning intellectual autonomy and free inquiry.
Introduction and Definitions
Contemporary professional philosophy risks losing its epistemic autonomy, Maura Priest argues in Professional Philosophy Has an Epistemic Autonomy Problem. Sociocultural and institutional factors are present in the philosophical community which make philosophers less likely to achieve epistemic autonomy than one would expect, considering the nature of philosophy as a discipline that requires, encourages, and (historically speaking) has produced many autonomous thinkers. Given these obstacles, Priest (2022, p. 71) contends that individual philosophers and the profession are worse off epistemically, as is the world at large. In short, given the influence of philosophy on the academy and the broader culture, less epistemic autonomy among philosophers makes academia and the wider scope of human affairs vulnerable to weaker reasoning, peer pressure, and conformity.
By ‘epistemic autonomy,’ Priest means roughly the virtue of governing one’s own intellectual life. (2022, p. 72) Epistemically autonomous agents have proper control over their intellectual lives and projects, thus regulating them without undue external interference. In contrast, epistemically non-autonomous persons are governed by others; these might be individuals, but social forces and worldviews can also exert control over the non-autonomous. (2022, pp. 72-73) Priest’s conception of epistemic autonomy is akin to Kant’s, who defined ‘enlightenment’ in terms of intellectual independence.[1]
For Priest, self-governance is not a matter of inappropriate self-reliance or obstinacy. Self-governance is consistent with open-mindedness to information from external sources, provided that the self-governing agent performs due diligence in recognizing other sources as trustworthy. (2022, p. 75) The trust given by an epistemically autonomous agent differs from that of one who lacks such independence insofar as the former is grounded in good reasons and method, while the latter probably lacks these. Priest also claims that epistemic autonomy is a degreed property (i.e., one can instantiate more of less of it). Furthermore, since philosophy is a matter of rational investigation and philosophers are trained rigorously in reasoning, argumentation, and creative thought, philosophers epistemically ought to “fall further to the epistemically autonomous end of the spectrum than others.”(2022, p. 77) This statement suggests that philosophers have little justification for abdicating their intellectual autonomy. Rather, the discipline of philosophy demands independence of mind. Philosophers who outsource their epistemic lives risk outsourcing their occupations. (2022, p. 77) In short, as Kant might have put it, epistemic autonomy is a matter of having the courage and diligence to think for oneself regarding one’s scholarship.
Examples of Epistemic Autonomy and Non-autonomy
Priest provides several examples of autonomy and non-autonomy in common employment and academia. Freedom in the workplace is associated with employees who are authorized to manage their schedules and projects without being micromanaged by supervisors (2022, p. 73). Regarding the academy, Priest illustrates non-autonomy by discussing the example of a professor who does not decide his own article topics and theses but delegates that responsibility to his peers (2022, p. 74). Other examples of non-autonomy include scholars who select research topics to please university administrators, obtain grants, or secure employment in a job market that rewards scholars who emphasize orthodox ideas (2022, p. 80).
In addition, Priest claims that the pressure to publish on issues that conform to topics which are popular in academia can lead scholars to produce work that is neither epistemically autonomous nor intellectually heterogeneous. (2022, pp. 82-84). For instance, suppose that a scholar selects a topic for research only because an administrator at her university has imposed a requirement that faculty write about that topic to be promoted at the end of the academic year. Or suppose that a scholar defends a thesis he does not genuinely endorse with an argument he prefers not to use, doing so only for the sake of publishing in a journal that is favorable to such viewpoints. These would be clear cases of abdicating epistemic autonomy (as Priest defines it) for non-epistemic goals.
The Argument
Priest proceeds to argue inductively that a paucity of epistemic autonomy is probable in contemporary academic philosophy because: (1) institutional features of the profession tend to prevent autonomy; (2) cultural features of the profession tend to prevent autonomy; and (3) psychological, sociological, and anthropological features of the profession tend to prevent autonomy. For example, Priest asserts that early in their careers, philosophers are pressured to transfer their intellectual agency to more experienced colleagues because the younger philosophers “believe that doing so will advance professional, social, and other non-epistemic aims” such as pleasing supervisors, obtaining grants and awards, securing employment, and attaining higher levels of status in the academic hierarchy. (2022, p. 80) This pressure might persist later in one’s career. Priest writes: “After tenure, philosophers might come face to face with new professional (and non-epistemic) pressures, e.g., the pressure to do research in areas that increase the odds of receiving research grants, of advancing their reputation either within their subfield or the profession at large, or that make it more likely their work will be published …” (2022, p. 82) The result is that a contemporary academic philosopher might spend a career doing work which is not intellectually independent, to the detriment of both the philosopher’s scholarship and the discipline at large.
This problem poses a challenge to the field of philosophy.[2] As Priest puts it, by the time a philosopher has gained considerable experience – an experience that should correspond with proper intellectual freedom – “habits of autonomy abdication might be engrained.” (2022, p. 85) Hence, it is more likely that the field of philosophy will have fewer excellent philosophers than it would have had were the problem absent, since ceteris paribus, philosophers who possess epistemic autonomy are better than those who lack it. Priest closes by articulating a plausible concern that the autonomy problem might subtly weaken the current field until it is “philosophy in name only” and that, given the magnitude of this problem, the effort to solve it is a worthy cause.[3] (2022, pp. 86-87)
Objection
At this point, the reader might protest: isn’t Priest’s inductive argument merely anecdotal? Is the argument weakened by hasty generalization? Does she cite broader empirical evidence beyond her observations? Priest answers that such criticisms miss the mark because she is not trying to prove that her experiences are guaranteed to be found by others across the discipline of philosophy, but rather that her examples “point out that the current systemic organization of the profession creates opportunity for these situations.” She continues: “Even if I had been making up my example out of thin air (I wasn’t), the institutional structure of the profession would still render the example plausible. If it is plausible, and if it follows that the profession is prone toward certain epistemic shortcomings, we all (professional philosophers) have reason for concern.” (2022, pp. 84-85) In other words, Priest seems to be claiming that the current structure of academic philosophy is such that examples like the ones she provides are likely to be experienced by those in the discipline.
Significance for the Reader
The significance of this problem seems evident, and not only for philosophy. In general, it is plausible to suspect that any discipline which is (a) structured to oppose intellectual self-governance and (b) has relatively few epistemically autonomous agents is: (i) less likely to be a discipline of open inquiry and (ii) more likely to be ossified by an inflexible orthodoxy which prevents the field from intellectual progress. As Priest notes, such disciplines are prone to weaker argumentation and poorer scholarship, and are less likely to attract talented students. (2022, pp. 71-72) Moreover, there is a worry that some of the field’s valuable research might never reach fruition because of institutional pressures that force authors to write about issues that do not interest them, which might in turn generate publications that infringe upon the author’s autonomy and do not reflect the author’s intended scholarship. (2022, p. 83)
Let us suppose that open inquiry operates on something like the following principle, which I call the principle of intellectual freedom (PIF): in general, permit public thought, inquiry, and speech which are intended for the pursuit of intellectual discovery, provided they do not violate anyone’s freedom of thought, inquiry, or speech and do not pose undue harm to any person.[4] A discipline that produces and promotes epistemically autonomous agents is more likely to employ the PIF, and therefore permit and explore seriously a wide range of views. Such exploration is conducive for a field to make epistemic progress regarding its distinct areas of inquiry, and might well lead to better and more frequent scholarship which reflects the genuine interests and ideas of the authors. But a domain burdened by the autonomy problem is less likely to achieve the goals of open investigation and intellectual independence, and thus inadequately equipped for continued growth concerning its distinct ends. In addition, if knowledge requires epistemic certainty and thus the acquisition of knowledge in the academy is less common than has frequently been supposed, as I have argued elsewhere, then we have further reason to tolerate rational inquiry in pursuit of intellectual discovery.[5]
The PIF raises possible solutions for the problem Priest describes. Academia might begin rigorously to promote epistemic autonomy, rational and respectful disagreement, doxastic tolerance, and intellectual freedom. Something like the PIF might be encouraged across universities, scholarly organizations, and other institutions of higher education. Such an effort might help to counteract the pressures toward non-autonomy that Priest addresses (supposing that such pressures exist), thereby motivating a capacious variety of perspectives and greater intellectual self-government among scholars. This in turn might improve the quality of contemporary philosophy, other disciplines, and the university as a whole.
Conclusion
Priest underscores a difficulty concerning autonomy that thinkers across academic disciplines should consider, regardless of whether their respective fields are currently facing the challenge. Even if the degree of severity of the autonomy problem is open to reasonable debate, Priest’s article is a helpful taxonomy of the sorts of non-epistemic interests likely to impede epistemic independence and free inquiry in the academy.
References
Crozat, E. (2022). Why Fallibilistic Evidence is Insufficient for Propositional Knowledge. In Logos and Episteme, Vol. 13, Issue 2, July 2022.
Crozat, E. (2022). Education and Knowledge. In Logos and Episteme, Vol. 13, Issue 3, September 2022.
Priest, M. (2022) Professional Philosophy Has an Epistemic Autonomy Problem. In J. Matheson & K. Lougheed (Eds.), Epistemic Autonomy (pp. 71-91). Routledge.
Kant, I. (1784). What is Enlightenment? Columbia University. http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html
[1] See What is Enlightenment?, available at http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html. Date of Access: September 8, 2022. Kant describes the epistemically non-autonomous (i.e., those in “self-imposed nonage”) as follows: “If I have a book that thinks for me, a pastor who acts as my conscience, a physician who prescribes my diet, and so on--then I have no need to exert myself. I have no need to think, if only I can pay; others will take care of that disagreeable business for me.”
[2] By extrapolation, one might be reasonably concerned that similar problems exist in other disciplines.
[3] Given the influence of philosophy on other disciplines, one might be concerned that this weakening of philosophy might spread through the academy.
[4] My use of ‘public’ corresponds roughly to Kant’s application of that term in his discussion of the public and private uses of reason in What is Enlightenment? He writes that the public use of reason ought to be free at all times, though there might be legitimate restrictions on the private use of reason.
[5] See Crozat, 2022 and 2022.