Belief is a taking not making true
What do I mean?
To believe a proposition is to take it as true, i.e., to affirm it. The proposition might be true, but not in virtue of your believing it. After all, it might be false despite your belief.
The mental faculty of belief is not a causal power. Belief is not creative. Generally, you can’t make a claim true merely by believing it. Instead, belief is an affirming power. You believe that which you accept as true, and unless the proposition you believe is epistemically certain for you, your belief is something of a risk; i.e., it’s a venture. You risk being wrong, though you venture to be right. Our doxastic endeavors are fraught with various degrees of risk.
But wait! You cannot make a proposition true merely by believing it? Take the proposition “Smith believes that p.” Call this proposition S. Can’t Smith make S true by believing it?
Not exactly. What (arguably) makes S true is the fact that Smith believes that p. Smith’s acceptance of S is a matter of his believing that he believes that p – which doesn’t quite make S true. Rather, it’s an affirmation of what makes S true, namely, that Smith already believes that p.
This might seem obvious. But these days, the obvious isn’t obvious.
Belief is a taking not making true.