Are Values Comparable?
Suppose that Jones and Smith are adults and Jones is seeking to know whether or not that p; to do so, he needs access to background information K. Smith is aware of Jones’ inquiry, is in a position to suppress part of K, and believes that if he suppresses part of K, say, evidence e, then Jones will be more likely to obtain the knowledge he seeks. Jones, however, would object to Smith’s suppression.
Is Smith justified in censoring the information that Jones needs? The epistemic paternalist is inclined to answer in the affirmative, at least in some cases. The advocate of epistemic autonomy (call him the epistemic autonomist) is inclined to say “no.” Is Jones justified in objecting to Smith’s suppression? The epistemic autonomist says “yes,” while the paternalist says “no.” Here, we have a genuine tension between the values of knowledge and epistemic/intellectual autonomy. It is not obvious which value is more important, if either.
But notice: so far, I am assuming two debated claims. First, that value pluralism (VP) is true. This is the view that more than one intrinsic value exists, as opposed to value monism (VM) which holds that there is only one intrinsic value. Second, assuming VP – which I will do for the sake of this post – I am also taking for granted that values are comparable, or at least that the two values addressed above are comparable. This position is called value comparabilism (VC), which denies value incomparabilism (VI).
Why assume VC? It might be that VI is the case, i.e., that values are not comparable. Perhaps values (all or some) do not stand in the axiological relations of better than, worse than, and equal to. Ruth Chang (2015: 205-207) aptly calls this the trichotomous comparison. For example, maybe, given the values of freedom and justice, the former is neither absolutely better than, worse than, or equal to the latter. Now, freedom might be better relative to some further goal, say, making one’s own decisions; justice might be better concerning the end of bringing a murderer to retribution. But these situations would involve construing freedom and justice as instrumental values. Arguably, they are also intrinsic and final values. As final values, perhaps freedom and justice as such are not comparable. Think about it: would you rather live in a world with freedom but no justice or in a world with justice but no freedom? Tough choice. Which world would be objectively better? Hard question to answer.
Similarly, perhaps the values of knowledge and epistemic autonomy as such are not comparable.
For me, some value juxtapositions present a difficult tension and appear to be matters of incomparability. The incomparability might be ontic or merely epistemic. This, however, is a topic for a future post. Another topic worth considering is whether political strife would be less likely if folks were to recognize that some values might be incomparable. A third topic to consider is whether political strife would be less likely if more people would be willing to admit their fallibility about difficult philosophical issues such as axiology.
Perhaps I’ll pursue these three issues later. For now, it’s late in the day, almost time to hit the hay.
Reference
Value Incomparability and Value Incommensurability. (In The Oxford Handbook
of Value Theory. Eds. Hirose, I. and Olson, J. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.)