A Taxonomy of Philosophical Hedonism
Here’s a short taxonomy of philosophical hedonism. Do you hold any of these positions? If so, why? If not, why not?
Value Hedonism/Axiological Hedonism
Let’s assume that intrinsic value is that which, for any person, objectively deserves that person’s esteem (or some other fitting attitude). According to value hedonism, there is only one intrinsic value: pleasure. All and only pleasure has intrinsic value. This is a version of value monism, which holds that there is only one intrinsic value and thus that things such as knowledge, wisdom, love, freedom, friendship, health, security, etc. are not valuable except as a means to pleasure — or as a means to whatever the sole value is. (Note: a value monist could hold that there is only one intrinsic value, but it’s not pleasure. It might be excellence, or wisdom, or love, etc.)
Normative Hedonism
Human beings ought to maximize pleasure, either for themselves (hedonistic moral egoism), or for their group (we might call this hedonistic tribalism), or for as many as possible (hedonistic utilitarianism). On this view, what makes an action morally right is that it maximizes pleasure. The end of pleasure justifies whatever means is necessary to achieve it.
Objections to normative hedonism are knocking on the door of my mind, but I won’t answer the door for now, since this post is merely a taxonomy.
Psychological Hedonism
Human beings desire and seek pleasure; we are motivated only by pleasure, or at least by pleasure more than by anything else.
Prudential Hedonism
Happiness is identical to pleasure. To the question “What is happiness?” the prudential hedonist answers: “Pleasure.”
I hear more knocking at my door.
* Here are a few points to consider:
–Notice that normative hedonism doesn’t follow from value hedonism. Just because something is good, it doesn’t follow that we are obligated to pursue it. For example, it would be good for Jones to pursue a full-time career as a firefighter and to pursue a full-time career as a medical doctor. But he can’t do both, and thus assuming that ought implies can, he is not obligated to pursue both goods.
Moreover, to say that normative hedonism follows from value hedonism would seem to be an attempt to derive an ought from an is. It is widely thought that this cannot be done.
–Notice that psychological hedonism differs from normative hedonism. The former is descriptive; the latter, normative.
–Notice that prudential hedonism does not hold that a pleasant feeling is the byproduct of happiness, which is something other than pleasure. Rather, prudential hedonism holds that happiness is identical to pleasure, which to my mind is wrong, but that is a topic for another post. This post is merely a taxonomy.